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This thesis addresses the reasons for mid-grade (0-2
to 0-4) Surface Warfare officer resignations. It makes
recommendations that would possibly increase retention for
the mid-grade Surface Warfare Officer Community. Statisti-
cal analyses were performed upon data from post-resignation
questionnaires. A list of the ten most reported reasons for
resigning was then compiled. A series of recommendations
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this thesis are: 1) to determine the
reasons officers of the Surface Warfare Community in paygrades
0-2 through 0-4 leave the Naval service; and 2) based upon
these reasons, develop recommendations that might enable
Navy management to develop effective action plans to encourage
Surface Warfare Officer retention. The need for increasing
Surface Warfare retention is discussed in the following
section.
A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER RETENTION
Information provided by OP136D2 (Officer Resignation
section) indicated that a retention rate of 40% to 45% for
Surface Warfare officers is necessary to meet the manning
needs for that community. The January/February 19 80 issue
of Perspective (a newsletter for Navy officers published by
the Naval Military Personnel Command) reported that Surface
Warfare Officer retention declined to 31% in FY79 from 38%
in FY78. The March/April 1980 issue of Perspective reported
a projected retention rate of 41% for the Surface Warfare
Community. The actual retention rates for FY78 and FY79,
along with the projected 41% retention rate and a stated
goal of 40% to 45%, indicated that retention, and perhaps
manning, within the Surface Warfare Community, were
inadequate.

At the time of the published reports in Perspective
,
retention rates were calculated on a minimum service require-
ment (MSR) plus two years. MSR is the initial service obli-
gation incurred by an officer. Once fixed by commissioning
and initial training, an officer's MSR does not change. The
typical MSR for a Surface officer who was commissioned through
the Reserve Officer Commissioning program is three years,
whereas, a Surface officer who graduated from the Naval Academy
has an MSR of five years. In the case of a Naval Aviator,
initial flight training modifies the aviator's MSR to 4.5
years after designation as a Naval Aviator (i.e., successful
completion of initial flight training) , regardless of com-
missioning source. Specifically, retention is the ratio of
the number of officers onboard at MSR+ 2 years to the number
onboard at MSR-1 year. Basing retention rates on the MSR
calculation did not take into account those officers who
were past the MSR+2 year point. For the Surface Warfare
Community, this group of officers would most likely be post
or senior department head Lieutenants . By not keeping account
of those officers past the MSR+2 point, the Navy was not
getting a true picture of its officer manning needs so that
retention rate figures were of limited value. However, on
1 September 19 80, the method of calculating retention was
changed. The new method consisted of year group tracking
by warfare designator past the 11 year point for a cohort
of officers. The new method allows for better personnel

management. As can be concluded from examining Table 1.1,
the MSR+2 method of calculating retention rates would not
reveal shortages in cohorts of officers beyond MSR+2. A
shortage of mid-grade (0-2 to 0-5) officers has occurred
in the Surface Warfare Community.
Table 1.1
Surface Warfare Officer Inventory vs
Programmed Authorizations (as of 1 July 19 80)
Number of Officers by Rank
CAPT & Above CDR LCDR LT LTJG
Required 771 1804 2258 2485 1756
Inventory 741 1738 2168 2218 2989
Deficient (-
)
or surplus (+) - 30 - 66 - 90 - 267 + 1233
A slight increase in the number of resignations by 0-3
and 0-4 Surface Warfare officers is shown in figure 1.1.
The resignations depicted by figure 1.1 are a comparison of
resignations by 0-2 to 0-4 officers with a Surface Warfare
designator (1110, 1160, 1115, 1165) in FY79 and FY80.
Resignations for the period October to August of FY80 are
compared to resignations from October to August of FY79.
No explanation was apparent for the decrease in the number
of 0-2' s (as seen in figure 1.1) resigning in FY80 as com-









As computed by the MSR+2 method, the retention rate for
Surface Warfare officers in FY80 was 39% compared to the
predicted 41%. Once again, retention within the Surface
Warfare Community fell below the needed 41% to 45%.
While the mid-grade shortage of Surface Warfare officers
is not as severe as for pilots (2256 personnel) or submariners
(600 personnel), it still poses problems for current and
future surface ship manning. The 19 79 Unrestricted Line
Officer Study reported that "the shortages that exist in the
Surface Warfare Community have serious implications, both for
Surface Warfare officers and for the Navy at large. Our
officers will spend more time at sea ..." and "The only way
the community can become healthy is through a dramatic improve-
ment in retention." A recent study [Alden, 1980], concluded
an increase of 21% in the number of surface combatant plat-
forms could be expected by 1990. This increase in the number
of ships will bring a corresponding increase in Surface
Warfare officer manning levels. Alden showed the total num-
ber of surface officer billets in 1978 to be 4,970; by 1990
he projected 6,052 billets. This would mean a 21.8% increase
in the number of surface officer billets from 1978 to 1990.
If the present trend in Surface Warfare officer retention
continues, the operational capability of the Surface Navy
and, possibly, the national security of the United States will
be degraded. The early identification of factors affecting
retention, coupled with vigorous measures designed to deal
12

with those factors, could do much to prevent the current
Surface Warfare officer shortage from becoming a crisis in
the future. This thesis is intended to be a step towards
that prevention.
B. SURVEY OF LITERATURE
In order to discover what areas of officer retention had
already been studied and which organizations or individuals
had performed those studies, two computer-based literature
searches were made. The first of these computer searches
was done through the Defense Documentation Center. The
second search was done on the holdings of the Naval Post-
graduate School Library, Monterey, Ca . The material held
in the Postgraduate School Library consisted of previous
theses and various technical reports. The time period covered
was from 1964 to the present (1 November 1980). The review
of past studies dealing with officer retention provided con-
siderable insight into current knowledge concerning approaches
to solving personnel turnover and retention problems. Rele-
vant studies drawn from the survey of literature will be dis-
cussed in the following section of this thesis.
In order to provide some logical order to the review of
those previous studies pertaining to officer retention, the
studies are discussed in chronological order (from the earliest
to the most recent)
.
In a thesis [Fitzgerald, 1964] completed at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca
.
, the author points out
13

that the then current method of determining the reasons for
junior officer resignations was not accurate and valid. In
his thesis, Lt . Fitzgerald recommended the application of
utility theory to develop a model for determining the reasons
for junior officer resignations. His belief was, that given
accurate resignation information, Navy management would be
able to solve the junior officer retention problem. This
researcher believes Lt. Fitzgerald's thesis was one of the
first attempts to develop a method for collecting and analyzing
officer resignation data.
A comparative analysis of retention and junior Naval offi-
cers and retention of junior executives within the Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Organization was done in 1965 by
Lieutenant Commanders Fawcett and Skelton. In their thesis,
the areas of salary structure, retirement, fringe benefits,
promotion opportunity, permanency of location, level of
responsibility and special ization^ prestige, job satisfac-
tion, security, and education were used to compare the Navy
with Pacific Telephone and Telegraph. The retention rate
at the time of that thesis for junior Naval officers was 8.8%,
while the retention rate for Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
was 64%. These retention rates were based upon retention
10 years after initial employment. The differences in reten-
tion rates were attributed to disparities in the above men-
tioned areas. In addition, a prime factor contributing to
low retention rates within the Navy and not experienced by
14

the junior executives of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
was identified. This factor was the long period of time
spent at sea and the associated additional cost of maintain-
ing a household while at sea. Recommendations based upon
the disparities discovered by Lcdr ' s Fawcett and Skelton
included increased pay (both base and sea pay) , increased
fringe benefits, better medical care, and efforts to in-
crease time with families while inport
.
A study [Harsh, 1965] was conducted for the Chief of
Naval Operations to explore factors of personal background
and Navy experience which might be related to officer reten-
tion and to estimate the possible effectiveness of various
benefits and policies for encouraging longer active duty
careers. The data base for the study by Harsh was a ques-
tionnaire mailed to a stratified random sample of 9 980 Navy
officers of all designators in ranks from Ensign (0-1) through
Captain (0-6) . A return rate of 93% resulted in 9137 ques-
tionnaires being available for analysis. Recommendations
based upon Harsh 's study included revised selection criteria
for future officer candidates and for certain retention incen-
tives. Among active duty officers, retention was found to
be related to such objectives as seeking responsibility,
advanced education, job security, challenge and risk; by
wanting to serve the country, to belong to a high-principled
group, to have respected co-workers, and to have fair treat-
ment. The researcher concluded, if such objectives and social
15

attitudes could be screened for in young officer candidates
at the time of their selection, then those candidates would
have a higher probability of retention than those then being
selected under the then current procedures.
The following (in order of importance in effecting reten-
tion) are Harsh ' s recommendations for retention incentives:
a 20% pay raise, compensation equal to civil service employees,
scholarships of $1000 per dependent child per college year,
sea and shore specialization, improved BOQs/Navy housing, and
a 4-6 year homeport continuity. Harsh 's study used data
from officers on active duty, whereas, this thesis used
questionnaire results obtained from officers who had actually
resigned.
A most exhaustive study of officer retention was done by
the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine Corps
Personnel Retention. This study was conducted from December
1964 until February 1966. The mission, as set forth in the
charter of the Task Force, was to:
1. Identify and examine the major factors bearing on
retention of high quality officers and enlisted personnel.
2. Develop a plan for attacking those retention problems,
which was to include:
a. specific recommendations
b. a program to implement the recommendations
c. identification of the specific Government offi-





The results of the study are contained in eleven volumes
Because of the mass of information, this researcher will
only point out certain findings and recommendations that
were found to be relevant to Naval officer retention. The
Secretary of the Navy's Task Force identified officer promo-
tion opportunities, officer distribution and management,
officer education and training, living conditions afloat
and ashore, dependent medical care, and pay/fringe benefits
as areas having a negative impact upon officer retention.
SECNAV NOTE 5420, dated 14 February 196 6, listed 82
separate recommendations from the task force that were
approved by the Secretary of the Navy. These 82 recommenda-
tions contained items which dealt with both officer and
enlisted retention. Some of the specific recommendations
for improving officer retention included: the establishment
of an Officers Career Planning Board, development of an
updated and fully integrated computer-assisted Personnel
Distribution and Management System, establishment of a Sur-
face Combatant School Course (currently the Surface Warfare
Officers School) , resumption of funding for the Habitability
Improvement program, modification of the Dependent's Medical
Care Act, and the provision of sea pay to both officer and
enlisted men in an amount adequate to recognize the unique
personal and family living conditions that characterize sea
duty. This study seems to have been the beginning of major




The relationship between career values and junior offi-
cer retention was explored in Naval Personnel and Training
Research Laboratory research report SRR 72-2 [Neumann, et al.,
19 72] . A Career Value Questionnaire was given to a sample
population of 488 NROTC officers, all commissioned prior to
1962. The sample was categorized on the basis of career
status. The low tenure group included 26% of the sample
(N = 126) who left the Navy after serving less than five
years active duty. The high tenure group consisted of 362
officers who remained on active naval duty from five to ten
years beyond their date of commission. The researchers found
that high and low tenure officers tended to agree on the
importance of various career values, and differences existed
on how the two tenure groups perceived the obtainability
of those values. Low tenure officers considered four items
"extremely important" or "somewhat above average in impor-
tance" and the probability of obtaining those rewards in
the Navy either "not very likely" or "very unlikely". Those
four items were:
• Full use of abilities
• Satisfactory home life
• Success through ability alone
• Work under consistent and intelligent personnel policies
Neumann, et al
.
, concluded that, in some cases, there was
the possibility of irreconciliable differences between an
individual's career values and those offered by the Navy.
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The researchers stated that improved selection procedures
seemed to be the best method of avoiding such problems.
The report concluded that further research was indicated
in order to determine whether high school seniors were able
to express their "career needs" prior to selection for an
officer commissioning program.
There was only one study [Lopez, 19 73] found in the
survey of literature which dealt specifically with Surface
Warfare officers. In Lopez's study, 162 Surface Warfare
officers (0-1 through 0-4) who were enrolled as students
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., during
March/April 1973, were included in the sample. A question-
naire was developed around two basic questions. The ques-
tions were, "What aspects of the Surface Navy or the Navy
in general make it attractive as a career?" and "What aspects
make it unattractive?" From those two questions, a fifty-
two item questionnaire dealing with career intentions was
developed and administered to the sample of 162 Surface
Warfare officers. Responses having the strongest stated
effect upon career intentions included: Basic Allowance
for Quarters for all afloat officers, better medical bene-
fits, orders for postgraduate education, and sea pay. Those
responses found to have the strongest negative effect upon
career intentions included new retirement proposals, peace-
time budget constraints, time away from homeport, and unexpec-
ted deployment or orders. Based upon the results of the
19

questionnaire, a list of 19 recommendations were made. The
list of recommendations included sea pay as a retention
incentive, payment of BAQ to all officers afloat, retention
of the Spot Promotion Program, and a minimum four-year tour
length for any CONUS area. While the above study identi-
fied areas having either a strong positive or a strong nega-
tive stated effect upon Surface Warfare officer career inten-
tions, it did not identify reasons given by those Surface
Warfare officers who had actually resigned from the Naval
service.
In a study o.f Unrestricted Line Naval officers (from five
commission sources) who were assigned to surface ships or
shore installations for their first assignment, it was found
that both the type of first assignment and the college edu-
cation major, as well as the commission source itself, were
associated with officer retention [Robertson & Ross, 19 79].
It was assumed by the researchers that retention could be
increased by determining the retention outcomes for various
assignment patterns and then using this information in future
officer allocation. A particular difficulty in evaluating
alternative allocation strategies was found to stem from
the instability of the obtained retention proportions for
source-to-assignment patterns containing few or no officers.
In trying to find a more accurate and stable estimator of
retention for source-to-assignment patterns containing few
or no officers, an evaluation of three estimation modes was
20

performed at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca.,
[Weitzman and Robertson, 1979]. Of the three Structural
Pattern Analysis (SPA) models evaluated, true-score, linear-
covariance, and independence, the third one was found to
be the most accurate and stable. The independence model also
provided more stable values than did calculations based on
actual retention outcomes. Weitzman and Robertson concluded
that the Independence SPA model would provide stable esti-
mates of personnel-retention proportions. Those estimates
could then be possibly used with linear-programming algorithms
in a source-to-assignment matrix to minimize personnel losses.
The most current (January, 1980) study of junior officer
retention listed in the literature was entitled: "Junior
Officer Retention: Another Perspective." This study was
sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Organizational
Effectiveness Research Program and was conducted by C. Brooklyn
Derr . This study addressed six issues most frequently asso-
ciated with junior officers resigning their commissions. Those
issues were:
• Poor Career Benefits
• Family Separations
. Loss of Esteem for the CO Role
• Perceived "Greener Pastures"




Derr applied findings from previous studies, Marriage/
Family Issues and Wife Styles across Naval Officer Career
Stages [Derr, 19 79] and More on Career Anchor Concepts
[Derr, 1979] to those six issues. The study concluded that
the Navy needed to develop new creative and fundamental career
development policies.
The survey of literature uncovered a number of studies
on officer retention. However, only one such study (Lopez,
1973) specifically addressed retention within the Surface
Warfare Community. No study was found that used post-resig-
nation data (data from officers who had actually resigned) in
analyzing reasons why officers left the Navy. Based upon
the findings of the literature survey, this researcher
decided to analyze post-resignation questionnaire data, and
to make recommendations based upon that analysis. The re-
search objectives, methodology and procedures used in this
thesis are discussed in the following chapter.
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II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY,
PROCEDURES, AND SPINOFF
The research objectives determined the approach utilized
in this study. The approach combined survey research with
various statistical analysis techniques. An effort is made
to describe the various analytical techniques in the methods
and procedures sections. Analyses which require a knowledge
of statistical techniques are included in the appendix sec-
tion (Appendix A). Attitudes, opinions, and comments of the
respondents to the Officer Separation Questionnaires (NAVPERS
1920/3 Rev. 1-73 and Rev. 4-79 ( (Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3)
were the source of the raw data used for various statistical
analyses. The results of the analyses were then compared




A major objective of this study was to determine the
reasons for leaving the Naval Service given by officers of
the Surface Warfare Community in paygrades 0-2 through 0-4.
Another objective was to take these reasons and to develop
suggestions that might enable Navy management to develop
effective action plans aimed at having a positive effect
upon Surface Warfare officer retention.
In order to accomplish those objectives, a content analy-
sis of the Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3
23

Rev. 1-73) (Figure 2.1) was to have been performed. While
this investigator was gathering data for the content analy-
sis, the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) revised the
survey instrument used to gather officer separation informa-
tion. This change was the result of the Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center's (NPRDC) Special Report
79-15 (Navy Officer Exit Statement Analysis). This study
was done by Dr. William H. Githens of NPRDC in response to
a request from the Chief of Naval Personnel for an evaluation
of Navy officer motivation and retention.
The objectives of NPRDC 's research were to identify the
reasons officers give for separating from the Naval service
and to develop an improved method of obtaining this information
A new survey questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79)
(Figures 2.2 and 2.3) was the end result of the NPRDC study.
A survey instrument was now available providing data to
which computerized statistical analysis techniques could be
applied. Given the development of the new separation ques-
tionnaire, this investigator decided to obtain an additional
data base using results obtained from the new format. OP136D2
(Officer Resignation section) agreed to forward completed
copies of the new questionnaire as they were received. Con-
siderable attention was given by OP136D2 to insure the con-
fidentiality of the survey respondents before the survey




TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS-B42)
RANK NAME (Last, First, Middle) SSN/FILE NO. /DESIGNATOR
YOUR REASONS FOR LEAVING THE NAVY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY (DSE REVERSE SIDE IF
NECESSARY)
.
WERE THERE ANY ACTIONS WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD
HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO MAKE THE NAVY YOUR CAREER?
D YES (Please specify).
D NO
COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT MEASURES COULD
HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INFLUENCE OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.
Signature
Figure 2.1. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (in use from




PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:
Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations.
Information is solicited from all separating
officers. Information furnished will not be
used for any administrative action concerning
you specifically and will no c be made a pare
of your permanent record.
The questionnaire Is required frora all officers
separating from the Navy and solicits their
views on Navy life. The data obtained from
this forts and others serves as a basis from
which management Initiatives are derived. Your
candid comments are appreciated. Additional
comments are requested on the back of chia form
INSTRUCTIONS
Please use soft lead pencil to darken
responses (one response per item).
QUESTION
If you are voluntarily separating, how Important
has eich of tne following been in your decision
Co separate? If you are Involuntarily
separating, how Important has each of the
following been In its Influence on you?
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4. Of some Importance
). Not true or not important
1. Better civilian employment
opportunities.
2. Dislike of military life-
style, rules and regulations.
3. Poor promotion opportunities
and policies.
4. Possible erosion of benefits.
5. Insufficient technical know-
ledge of superiors.
6. Lack of a carser for given
specialty/designator.
7. Long hours and work pressure.
8* Too much family separation.
9. Lack of sufficient fringe
benefits.





12. Poor quality of living
quarters/BAQ lnequicles.
13. Insufficient pay.
14. Not selected/not given oppor-
tunity to attend PC school
15. Type of education or training
desired Is not provided.
1 2 3nun 4 5rr rr
rr rr rr rr rr
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22- Long or excended deploy-
ments .





25. Too ouch crisis management.
26. Lack of recognition for
accomplishments/self respect
27. Ceographlc instability/
transient nature of Navy.
28. Unable to sufficiently
plan and control career.
29. Unsat lslactory officer
evaluation system.
30. Demands of Navy Imping-
ing on personal life.
12 3 4 5
rr n ii rr rr
rr rr rr rr rr
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o
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Figure 2.2 Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Front) . (In




RANK NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE) DESIC
PLEASE EXPAND AS DESIRED ON YOUR INDICATED RESPONSES FOR LEAVING THE NAVY:
PLEASE INDICATE ANY ACTION WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO
REMAIN IN THE NAVY:
COMMANDING OFFICSK'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO INFLUENCE THIS OFFICER
TO REMAIN CN ACTIVE DUTY:
Figure 2.3. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Back) . (In




In view of the availability of responses to the revised
Officer Separation Questionnaire, this researcher decided
to perform various statistical analyses upon the data avail-
able from the revised questionnaires (figures 2.2 and 2.3).
These analyses were to be the mainstay of this study. They
were supported by a limited content analysis of the previously
collected older surveys. The individuals in the sample used
for this study were Surface Warfare officers in the paygrades
of 0-2 through 0-4. The label Surface Warfare officer, as
used in this study, includes the following designators:
Officer Designator (Designator Code)
1. Surface Warfare Qualified, Regular
Navy (1110)
2. Surface Warfare Qualified, Reserve (1115)
3. Surface Warfare Trainee, Regular
Navy (1160)
4. Surface Warfare Trainee, Reserve (1165)
The total sample (N = 281) was composed of 148 respondents
to NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (Figure 2.1) and of 133 respon-
dents to NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Figures 2.2 and 2.3).
A more detailed breakdown of the sample is shown in Table 2.1.
This sample represents responses from approximately 400
separated Surface Warfare officers who could have responded
during the period the data were collected. This quantity
was derived from the use of an estimate of a 70% return rate




































representation of attitudes, opinions and comments of Sur-
face Warfare officers at the time of their resignations
from the Naval service. The time period covered by these
questionnaires was from late 1978 until 1 November 1980.
The November 19 80 cut-off date was established due to time
requirements involved in completing this thesis.
C. PROCEDURE
For the readers who might not have had a recent exposure
to the various statistical terms used in this section, Appen-
dix A lists the relevant terms and their meanings.
The questionnaire labeled NAVPERS 1920/3 (Rev. 4-79)
(Figure 2.2) has thirty items dealing with reasons for
separating from the Naval service. Each respondent was asked
to mark each item on a Likert scale as to how important that
particular item was in the respondent's decision to separate.






4. Of some importance
5. Not true or not important
To keep count of the ranks and warfare designators of
the respondents, the following codes were assigned: (7) LTJG,
(8) LT., (9) LCDR, (1110) Surface Warfare Qualified, Regular
Navy, (1115) Surface Warfare Qualified, Reserve, (1160) Surface
30

Warfare trainee, Regular Navy, (1165) Surface Warfare trainee,
Reserve. Each questionnaire with its responses was encoded
onto a punch card for subsequent batch processing.
Subprogram FREQUENCIES from the SPSS package was selected
as the primary means of statistical analysis of the data.
The first analysis done on the data was a separate frequency
table for each of the thirty items on the questionnaire.
The SPSS program produces the absolute frequency, the rela-
tive frequency in percent, the adjusted frequency in percent
and the cumulative adjusted frequency in percent. Also
included in the table are missing values (if any) for each
response item on the questionnaire.
The second analysis performed upon the data using sub-
program FREQUENCIES, was the development of histograms for
all responses to each item. Included with each histogram
were the mean, skewness, standard deviation and kurtosis.
A complete reproduction of those results is available in
Appendix B.
The items were then ranked in increasing order of their
mean values. (This is the same ranking method used by
OP136D2.) The lower the value of the mean, the greater the
degree of reported importance that particular item from the
questionnaire had in the average respondent's decision to
separate from Naval service. The top ten items in ranking
were then compared to the ten items produced in a report
done by OP136D2. The ranked list was then compared with
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responses from all Navy officers, Unrestricted Line Officers
(URL), and Surface Warfare officers. The results of this
ranking and comparison are discussed in the next chapter.
One reason for conducting analyses on data from a survey,
apart from the accumulation of information on simple varia-
bles, is to make comparisons between two or more variables
and to draw conclusions about their relationships.
The analysis of the data indicated that the primary reason
Surface Warfare officers reported for leaving the Naval service
was too much family separation (Question 8) . To this inves-
tigator, there seemed to be three other items in the ques-
tionnaire that might be related to the family separation
item. These items, in order of their mean values, from most
important to least important, were:
Q22 - Long or extended deployment (Mean = 2.470)
Q30 - Demands of Navy impinging on personal life (Mean = 2.863)
Q27 - Geographic instability/transient nature of the Navy
(Mean = 3.351)
In order to test the possible interrelationships of those
items, Pearson's r's and Kendall's Tau B's were computed. The
results of that analysis are discussed 'in the next chapter.
D. SPINOFF
In March of 1980, this investigator visited Dr. William
Githens of Navy Personnel Research and Development Center.
The purpose of the appointment was to discuss certain aspects
of this study. While doing initial data collection and
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preliminary content analysis, it became obvious that the
questionnaire in present use (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79)
(shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3) could be improved. The most
obvious improvement would be in the area of processing the
responses to the separation questionnaire. The Enlisted
Separation Questionnaire, OPNAV 1910/1 (7-79) (shown in
Figures 2.4 and 2.5), already in use, utilized an optical-scan
form. The optical-scan form allows data to be read directly
into the computer and eliminates the need for keypunching.
By eliminating the punched cards, processing man-hours and
other associated costs are reduced.
The Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 19 20/3 Rev.
4-79) (Figures 2.2 and 2.3) asked questions about why an
officer was separating, but did not provide data about the
officer as an individual, e.g., source of commission, for-
mal education, situation concerning resignation, type of
duty last assigned, sex, and marital status, to name a few.
This led to the inclusion of a demographic data section on
the front section of the new questionnaire [OPNAV 1910 (7-80)
]
(Figure 2.6) . With the use of a demographic section on the
new questionnaire, Navy management could, over a period of
time, begin to look for trends in the demographics of
separating officers. These possible trends, combined with
item responses, could allow Navy management to focus attention





UPNAV 1910 1 1/ /AllftSIl
INSTRUCTIONS:
Your sincere responses to the following
questions are needed to help improve de-
cisions affecting Navy personnel. Use a
soft lead pencil to indicate your responses
































































































































PR IVACY ACT STATEMENT •
Under the authority of 5 USC 301 requlations you are requested to complete this
j
questionnaire Information furnished will ba used for statistical studies to help I
the Navy improve policies and procedures. It will not be used tor any adminis- |
trative action concerninq you specifically and will not be made part of your I
permanent record No adverse actions will be taken if you decide not to furnish
the requested information.
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Figure 2.4. Sample Enlisted Separation Questionnaire




IF YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING, how important has each of the following bean ^
in your decision to separate? f^
IF YOU ARE BEING INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED, how important hat each of the +* ,o*
following been in its influence on you? f
1
.
Working hours ara too long W
2. Fear of losing more fringe benefits O
3. Senior officers don't care about enlisted people O
4. Not being treated with respect O
5. Poor berthing areas afloat U
6. Poor quality of dental care O
7. Too many petty regulations O
8. Work I'm assigned doesn't use my educational skills O
9. Poor leadership of my work center supervisor O
10. Little freedom to use non-work hours as I want O
1 1 . Pay is too low ' O
y .-.
12. Lack of recognition for doing a good job 1 O
13. Dislike wearing of the uniform O
14. Fear of losing retirement benefits O
15. I want to live someplace permanently O
16. Dislike family separation O
17. Can't get the education or skills that I want O
18. Too much unfair treatment O
19. Poor quality of Commissary/ Exchange O
20. Can't get into the rating I want O
21. Poor quality of medical care O
22. Not enough chance to do job my way O
23. Dislike sea duty O
24. Navy housing not available or of poor quality O
25. Can't get the detailing desired O
26. Dislike the kind of people I must work with O
27. I want to be able to quit anytime I want O
28. Regulations keep me from advancing faster O
29. To keep from losing Gl benefits O
30. Not enough chance to do more interesting/challenging work O
Figure 2.5. Sample Enlisted Separation








































During the aforementioned visit, Dr. Githens remarked
that the Navy Military Personnel Command (NMPC) had already-
tasked him to create a new questionnaire. He planned to
convert the questionnaire then in use to a form that could
be optically scanned and that included a demographic data
section. This investigator was invited to submit recommen-
dations for the new form to NPRDC. This was done.
The new form (shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7) went into
use 1 October 1980. It is believed by this investigator
that its use will result in more useful data and in more
efficient data collection. It is also felt by this inves-







YOUR SINCERE RESPONSES TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
ARE NEEDED TO HELP IMPROVE DECISIONS AFFECTING NAVY
PERSONNEL.
UtC HO 2 FINCH OWLr HDD
• DO NOT USE INK OR BALLPOINT PENS.
• BLACKEN THE BUBBLE COMPLETELY
• MAKE NO STRAY MARKS.
• ERASE COMPLETELY ANY RESPONSE YOU
WISH TO CHANGE.
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations you
are requested to complete this questionnaire
Information furmsned wil 1 be used 'or statistical
studies to help the Navy improve policies and
procedures If will not be used foi any administrative;
action concerning you specifically ana will not be
made part of your permanent reccrd Mo adve'se






















SERVICE FORCE SHIP fQ
SUBMARINE ©
HEADQUARTERS/MAJOR STAFF Q
FLEET AIR SQUAORON (Q
SUPPORT AIR SQUAORON O
FLEET TRAINING SQUADRON fQ
























































































































































































































Figure 2.6. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire




IF YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING. HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN YOUR DECISION TO SEPARATE"
IF YOU ARE BEING INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED. HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN ITS INFLUENCE ON YOU"





i loss of Gl Bill benefits
2 Oisnke of military l.festvle/restric:ing
rules ana regulations
3. Door prcmot.on policies and opportune es
4 Possib.e erps.on of benef.ts
iretiremem, commissary, etc. I




5. Lack of career for given
specialty/ designator
7 Long hou'S and work pressure
8. Too much family separation




10. Lock of responsibility and autnonty CC1
ocjc
dob
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity,
professional stimulation ....
12. Poo' qua'ity of living quarters/8AQ
inequities
1 3. insufficient pav
14. Lack 3f opportunity to attend
postgraduate scnool





























16 "cor utilization of abilities.
Skills, education
17. Not selected ror desired specialty/
designator cnange
18. Lack of performance appraisal career




21 Lack of command opportunity
22. Lack cf adequate dependent
medical care
23. Froblems with assignment/oetailing
24 Manpower/supplies/! i nancia
support prooiems
25. Too mucn crisis rna~igemeni








30 Demands of Navy impinging on
personal Me
PLEASE CHECK TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY
ABOVE DO NOT ADEQUATtLV REFLECT YOUR REASON FOR
BOX AT THE TOP OF THIS SIOE OF THE FORM.
ITEM ON FRONT AND BACK OF THIS FORM IF THE ITEMS
SEPARATING. PLEASE STATE YOUR REASON WITHIN THE
Figure 2.7. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire




III. RESULTS OF SURVEY ANALYSES
As was stated in the procedures section of Chapter II
,
this chapter discusses the results of the analyses conducted
upon data obtained from Officer Separation Questionnaires
(NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (Figure 3.1) and NAVPERS 1920/3
Rev. 4-79) (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The first analysis to be
discussed is the ranking by mean value of the thirty items
on the front page of Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS
1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (shown in Figure 3.2). The second analy-
sis, that is discussed, is the comparison of results of this
thesis with the results of a similar study by OP136D2 (Officer
Resignation section) . The last section contained in this
chapter discusses the results and conclusions drawn from an
item intercorrelation study.
A. RESULTS OF RANKING OF SURVEY RESPONSE ITEMS BY MEAN VALUE
The responses of 133 officers to the Officers Separation
Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 3.2 and
3.3) were analyzed. The 133 officers (all with Surface War-
fare designators) were 0-2' s, 0-3 's, and 0'4s who had resigned
during the time period April 1979 through 1 November 19 80.
The mean was computed for each of the thirty items on the
questionnaire (Figure 3.2) . The items were then ranked in
order of their mean values, from the lowest value to the




TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS-B42)
RANK NAME (Last, First, Middle) SSN/FILE NO. /DESIGNATOR
YOUR REASONS FOR LEAVING THE NAVY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY (USE REVERSE SIDE IF
NECESSARY)
.
WERE THERE ANY ACTIONS WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD
HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO MAKE THE NAVY YOUR CAREER?
D YES (Please specify).
D NO
COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT MEASURES COULD
HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INFLUENCE OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.
Signature
Figure 3.1. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 19 20/3 Rev. 1-7 3 (in use from




PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:
Under U,e .luthorlty of 5 USC 301 regulation*
,
Information Is solicited from all separating
officers. Information furnished will not be
used r>r any administrative action concerning
you specifically and will not be made a part
of your permanent record.
The questionnaire la required froo all officers
separating frura the Navy and solicits their
views on Navy life. The data obtained from
this form and others serves as a basis froa
which management initiatives are derived. Your
candid comments are appreciated. Additional
comments are requested on the back of thla form
INSTRUCTIONS
Please use soft lead pencil to darken
responses (one response per item).
QUESTION
If you are voluntarily separating, how Important
has eich of tne following been In your decision
to separate? If you are involuntarily
separating, how Important has each of the













































































































4. Of soae laportsnce
5. Not true or not important
1. Better civilian employment
opportunlt lea
.
2. Dislike of sllltary life-
style, rules and regulations.
3. Poor promotion opportunities
and policies.
4. Possible erosion of benefits.
5. Insufficient technical know-
ledge of superiors -
6. Lack of a career for given
specialty /designator.
7. Long hours and work pressure.
8. Too much family separation.
9. Lack of sufficient fringe
benefits*





12. Poor quality of living
quarters/BAQ inequities.
13. Insufficient pay-
14. Not selected/not given oppor-
tunity to attend PC achool
15. Type of education or training
desired is not provided.
1 2 3
rr rr n 4 Sn rr
n rr rr rr rr
n rr rr n rr
n rr rr n rr
ooo oo













rr rr rr rr rr
16. Poor utilization of skills,
education, abilities.
17. Not selected for desired
specialty/designator change
18. Lack of concerned, know-
ledgeable guidance/advice.






21. Lack of command opportunity
22. Long or extended deploy-
ments .




23. Too auch crisis management.
26. Lack of recognition for
accoapllshaents/self respect
27. Geographic instability/
transient nature of Navy.
28. Unable to sufficiently
plan and control career.
29. Unsatisfactory officer
evaluation system.
30. Demands of Navy imping-
ing on personal life.
12 3 4 5
o oooo
rr rr n rr rr
rr rr rj rr (D











rr rr rr rr rr
Figure 3.2 Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Front). (In
use from April 1979 until October 1980)
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COMMAND / ACT UV IT
Y
RANK MAMS (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE) DESIC
PLEASE EXPAND AS DESIRED ON YOUR INDICATED RESPONSES FOR LEAVING THE NAVY:
PLEASE INDICATE ANY ACTION WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO
REMAIN IN THE NAVY:
COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO INFLUENCE THIS OFFICER
TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY:
Figure 3.3. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Ref. 4-79 (Back). (In
use from April 1979 until October 1980)
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providing the item means are found in Appendix B of this
thesis. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the results of this
ranking by mean value.
With Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3
Rev. 1-73) (Figure 3.1), the only method available for the
officer separating from Naval service to express reasons for
resignation was to write down answers to open-ended questions,
e.g., "State your reasons for leaving the Navy in order of
priority" or "Were there any actions which the Navy could
reasonably have taken which would have influenced you to
make the Navy your career?" Officer Separation Questionnaire
(NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figure 3.3) also provided for
this method of responding. In addition to the written
responses, a section (Figure 3.2) of Likert scaled items was
included on NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79.
Utilizing data gathered from both NAVPERS 19 20/3 Rev.
1-73 and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3),
a list of ten Likert scaled reasons for resigning along with
written comments was constructed by this researcher. These
ten items from Table 3.1 were those ten having the lowest
means. This listing (Table 3.2) of ten Likert items is in
order of mean values where the lower the mean value, the
more important the item was as a reason given by 0-2 to 0-4
Surface Warfare officers for resigning from Naval service.
After each Likert item, a few of the responses from the




Ranking of Survey Responses of Mid-Grade (0-2 to 0-4)





Not true or not important
Item
Too much family separation
Insufficient pay
Too much crisis management
Long or extended deploymnets
Demands of Navy impinging on personal life
Possible erosion of benefits
Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional
stimulation
Lack of recognition for accomplishmnets/
self respect




Billet, task or job dissatisfaction
Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities
Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy
Manpower/supplies/financial support problems
Lack of sufficient fringe benefits
Long hours and work pressure
Problems with detailing or assignments
Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system
Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities
Poor promotion opportunities and policies
Lack of concerned, knowledgeable guidance/advice
Better civilian employment opportunities
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Lack of responsibility and authority
Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors
Dislike of military lifestyle, rules and
regulations
Lack of a career for a given specialty/
designator
Type of education or training desired is
not provided
Not selected for desired specialty/
designator change
Lack of command opportunity





Table of the Ten Most Important Reasons Given by Mid-Grade
(0-2 to 0-4) Surface Warfare Officers for Resigning
(with Amplifying Comments) (N = 281)
Response Scale: 1. Extremely important
2. Very Important
3. Important
4. Of Some Importance
5. Not True or Not Important
1. Too much family separation. (Mean value = 2.143)
1110 LCDR Too many family separations. In this day and age,
children need a fulltime father.
1110 LT I'm a family man, I like the idea of my family
having roots, vice being shuffled around. Long
hours with deployments makes being a good father
rather tough . (Better dependent bennies)
1110 LT Practically all my reasons for leaving the Navy
are related to lengthy family separations. In
all other respects I have been quite happy with
Navy life.
1110 LT By far my most important reason for leaving the
Navy is the long family separations. I could see
nothing ahead but many more long months a year
away from home.
1110 LT The extended family separations (deployments)
require a certain personal sacrifice of all family
members that I feel my family does not wish to
endure anymore.
2. Insufficient pay. (Mean value = 2.436)
1110 LCDR Pay and benefits are better all the way around on
the outside and getting better every day.
1110 LCDR Primarily, geographic/financial stability for
myself and my wife.
1110 LT Military pay scales are not corrmensurate with
the hours and responsibilities required to ade-
quately perform one's job.
1110 LTJG My average work day was 12 to 16 hours per day
on the ship. For an 0-2 over 3 that works out to





3. Too much crisis management. (Mean value = 2.462)
1110 LT Nomadic lifestyle and direction by crisis
management.
1110 LT Crisis management is the rule rather than the
exception in the Fleet. There is dissatisfaction
at all levels, with very few exceptions.
1110 LTJG On my ship, crisis management was the rule rather
than the exception. Everything was due in "yesterday",
1110 LTJG Never ending crisis management in the Navy's
inspection oriented environment.
4. Long or extended deployments. (Mean value = 2.470)
1110 LCDR The amount of sea duty and thus family separation
and turmoil associated with making 0-5 no longer
made a Navy career attractive.
1110 LT The extended periods away from my family has
caused excessive tension on my marriage.
1110 LT Extended deployments, crisis management, and lack
of support all led to job dissatisfaction.
1110 LTJG Extended I.O. deployments are not why I joined
the Navy.
5. Denands of Navy inpinging on personal life. (Mean value = 2.863)
1110 LT Divorce resulting from deployments—something I
don't care to experience again.
1110 LT Main reason for separation is personal family problems
resulting from long at sea periods.
1110 LT Sea duty, regardless of whether or not the ship is
deployed, is not comDatible with a stable family
life.
1110 LT Family problems caused by absence.
6. Possible erosion of benefits. (Mean value = 3.008)
1110 LCDR I am leaving the Navy because I feel I receive
inadequate pay, I perceive an erosion of benefits,
and I am separated from my wife and two children
an unacceptable amount of time.
1160 LT Medical coverage and quality of services provided
to dependents is poor and unsatisfactory. Long
waiting periods for appointments, cursory exams
and poor staffing. I cannot best serve my Navy, if





1110 LT Shrinking fringe benefits, shrinking economy and
shrinking desire to be away from spouse and
daughter cause the untimely exit of the individual
mentioned above.
1110 LTJG Erosion of benefits and pay not comparable with
civilian pay.
7. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation.
(Mean value = 3.083)
1110 LCDR Lack of positive environment that is conducive
to positive personal growth.
1110 LTJG Suppressed initiative/creativity. I have been
told I am not supposed to have an opinion.
8. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect. (Mean value = 3.115)
1110 LT There is a marked lack of recognition for a job
well done, but if you ever make a mistake you can
rest assured that it will never be forgotten.
1115 LT In general, I found all sea duty commands to which
I was attached, quick to pay lip service to the
cause of J.O. retention but in its application,
they were woefully inadequate.
1110 LTJG In 3 1/2 years on a DDG, not once did I see an
officer commended, not once did I receive ade-
quate career counselling, not once did the CD/}©
really talk to their officers.
1160 LTJG Generally the basic reason can be summed up as:
too much frustration and not enough personal
satisfaction or recognition.
9. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career (Mean value = 3.153)
1110 LT After my first tour, I lost control of my career
and became a body to fill in manning voids rather
than a well planned career pattern and my pro-
fessional development suffered accordingly.
1110 LT My primary reason for leaving the Navy is the
inability to plan my own career and the lack of
advancement opportunities if I deviate from
designated "career paths".
1110 LT The availability of a career path allowing speciali-
zation in small craft warfare, tactics and develop-
ment would have been an extremely attractive
alternative for me personally and of much advan-




1160 LTJG Often juniors are convinced that decision they
are making will result in a desired career pattern,
but it doesn't, and there is no guidance to indi-
cate a poor choice.
10. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors.
(Mean value = 3.323)
1110 LTJG Because managerial and leadership qualities of
my superiors on the ship were so poor, crisis
management was the rule rather than the exception.
.
Note : The above was the only written response out of 281
questionnaires that specifically addressed insuffi-
cient managerial or leadership qualities of superiors.
This could very well be due to the section on the
back of either revision that asks for Commanding
Officers assessment. An officer would be very
hesitant to make critical comments concerning his
superiors when he knows that those same superiors
were going to review those comments. The situation
could be particularly bad if the resigning officer
had some length of time left to serve in that command,
The questionnaire (OPNAV 1910(7-80) , shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5)
that became effective 1 October 1980 deletes the Commanding Officers
assessment section. This deletion may promote more comments concerning
insufficient managerial or leadership qualities of superiors.
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3.1) are given to provide insight as to why a particular
Likert response was given. The written response is prefaced
by the designator and rank of the Surface Warfare officer
who provided the response. In table 3.2, the mean values
fall between a range of 1 to 5, where a value of 1 is "extremely
important" and a value of 5 is "not true" or "not important."
The ten reasons shown in table 3.2 represent areas on
which top level Navy management should focus attention in
trying to solve the Surface Warfare officer retention problem.
Recommendations dealing with these issues are given in Chap-
ter IV of this thesis.
B. THESIS RESULTS COMPARED WITH OPNAV RESULTS
In July of 19 80, OPNAV 136D2 (Officer Resignations section)
produced and distributed a memorandum of Officer Separation
Questionnaire survey results. The time period of officer
resignations covered in that memorandum was from January 19 80
through June 1980. Research results from this thesis were
compared with the results presented in the OPNAV memorandum.
This comparison of Surface Warfare officers against other
designators was done to determine if reasons given for re-
signing differed among various designators. Both OPNAV
136D2 (Officer Separation section) and this investigator uti-
lized data obtained from Officer Separation Questionnaire
(NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
This investigator collected data from January 19 80
until 1 November 1980. OPNAV 132D2 (Officer Resignations
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OPNAV 1910 (7-80) (TEST)
INSTRUCTIONS
YOUR SINCERE RESPONSES TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
ARE NEEDED TO HELP IMPROVE DECISIONS AFFECTING NAVY
PERSONNEL
-— T"
usc no l PINCH oniv mr
• DO NOT USE INK OR BALLPOINT PENS
• 8LACKEN THE BUBBLE COMPLETELY
• MAKE NO STRAY MARKS
• ERASE COMPLETELY ANY RESPONSE YOU
WISH TO CHANGE
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations mu
are requested to complete this ouest'onnjire.
Information furnished will be used foi statistical
studies to help the Navy irnorove pjln.ies and
procedures If will not be used tor any administrative
action concerning you specifically and will not be
made part of your permanent record No adverse
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Figure 3.4. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire




IF YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING. HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN YOUR DECISION TO SEPARATE?
IF YOU ARE BEING INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED. HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN ITS INFLUENCE ON YOU?





1 Loss of Gl Bill benefits
2. Dislike of military lifestyle/restricting
rules and regulations
3. Poor promotion po'icies and opportunities




6 Lack of career for given
specialty/designator
7 Long hours and work pressure
8. Too much family separation
9. Lack of sufficient fringe benefits
(recreation, commissary, etc )
10. Lack of responsibility and authority
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity,
professional stimulation
12. Poor quality of living quarters/bAQ
inequities
13. Insufficient pay
14. Lack cf opportunity to attend
postgraduate scnool

































16. Poor utilization of abilities,
skilis. education . .
1 7. Not selected for desired specialty/
designator change
18. i-ack of performance appraisal/career




21. Lack of command opportunity
22. Lack of adequate dependent
medical care
23. Problems with assignment/detailing
24. Manpower/ supplies 'financial
support prooiems
Too much crisis management



























PLEASE CHECK TO 8E SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY
A80VE DO NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT YOUR REASON FOR
BOX AT THE TOP OF THIS SIDE OF THE FORM.
ITEM ON FRONT AND BACK OF THIS FORM. I
SEPARATING. PLEASE STATE YOUR REASON
F THE ITEMS
WITHIN THE
Figure 3.5. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire




section) , on the other hand, used in their memorandum data
collected from 2 January 1980 until 30 June 1980. This re-
sulted in an added four, month period of data gathering by
this researcher. The data for the comparison portion of
this thesis were from 133 Surface Warfare officers of ranks
0-2 to 0-4, while the data base for the OPNAV study was 321
Naval officers of various ranks and designators.
All of the 133 officer's questionnaires used by this
researcher were completed by officers having the Surface War-
fare designator. While the 320 respondents used in the OPNAV
study had various warfare designators. Within the 321 respon-
dents providing data for the OPNAV study were 72 officers
with Surface Warfare designators. The added four month
collection period used by this researcher allowed for the
collection of data from 61 more Surface Warfare officers
than were available for the OPNAV study.
Three comparisons were made. The first was a comparison
of data from 321 resigning Navy officers in the OPNAV sample
with data from the 133 Surface Warfare officers in the thesis
sample. This comparison is shown in Table 3.3. The second
comparison was URL (Unrestricted Line) officers (OPNAV study)
with Surface Warfare officers (thesis sample). Table 3.4
illustrates the URL officer vs. Surface Warfare officer
comparison. The last comparison was made between Surface
Warfare officers (OPNAV study) and Surface Warfare officers
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The top ten most important reasons (determined by mean
value) for resigning from the Naval service of all Naval
officers (OPNAV study) were compared with the top ten most
important (also determined by mean value) reasons given by
Surface Warfare officers (thesis research) . The Surface
Warfare officers indicated two reasons for resigning that
were not found among the top ten reasons given by the OPNAV
all officer group. These two reasons were Long or extended
deployments (Q22) and Lack of recognition for accomplishments/
self respect (Q26) . The OPNAV all-officer group thought
Manpower/supplies/financial support problems (Q24) were
important enough to be among the top ten reasons, whereas
the Surface Warfare group did not. With the exception of
the above mentioned three items, all of the top ten reasons
for resigning were the same. The only difference in these
other items was the degree of importance placed on them by
the surveyed groups. Table 3.3 illustrates the differences
in ranking of importance.
The results (shown in table 3.4) of the comparison be-
tween URL officers and Surface Warfare officers were simi-
lar to the results of the comparison between all Navy officers
and Surface Warfare officers . There were again two items
thought to be more important for resigning by the Surface
Warfare officer group than by the all-URL group. These two
particular items were lack of recognition for accomplishments/
self-respect (Q26) and insufficient managerial/leadership
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qualities of superiors (Q20) . There were also two items in
the list of top ten reasons given by the URL officer group
which were not found in the Surface Warfare officer's group
of "top ten." These were billet, task or job dissatisfac-
tion (Q19) and poor utilization of skills, education and
abilities (Q16) . Once again, the only difference between
the remaining "top ten" items on the two lists was in the
order of importance.
The final comparison (shown in Table 3.5) was made be-
tween the responses of the two Surface Warfare officer
groups, the OPNAV study group and the thesis research group.
It should be pointed out that some (at most 72) of the 321
questionnaires analyzed in the OPNAV study were included in
the 133 questionnaires analyzed by this researcher. The
sample of Surface Warfare officers used in this thesis in-
cluded only one response in their "top ten" list that was
not also found in the OPNAV Surface Warfare officer's top
ten list. This single response was "Unable to sufficiently
plan and control career" (Q28) . The OPNAV Surface Warfare
officers had one reason not found in the top ten list of the
thesis Surface Warfare officers. This reason was "Poor
utilization of skills, education, abilities" (Q16) . The
other items found in the top ten were identical for both
groups. The only difference was the order of their ranking.
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C. ITEM INTERCORRELATION STUDY
As was mentioned in the procedure section of Chapter II
of this thesis, this investigator hypothesized a relationship
between Q8 (too much family separation) and: Q22 (Long or
extended deployments)
,
Q30 (Demands of Navy impinging on
personal life) , and Q27 (Geographic instability/transient
nature of Navy). Kendall's Tau B and Pearson's r were cal-
culated to test those hypotheses.
The results of those tests are summarized in Table 3.6.
The correlations are presented in order of the value of
Kendall's Tau B and Pearson's r between Q8 and the other
items (from the highest positive values to the lowest posi-
tive values) . When responses to Q8 (too much family separa-
tion) was correlated with responses to Q22 (Long or extended
deployments), values of .65 for Kendall's Tau B and .74 for
Pearson's r were found. Both Kendall's Tau B and Pearson's
r had a statistical significance of < .001. These values
indicate a very strong positive relationship between responses
Q8 and Q22.
A value of .41 for Kendall's Tau B and a value of .47
for Pearson's r was found between Q8 (Too much family separa-
tion) and Q27 (Transient nature of the Navy) and the signi-
ficances for both tests were < .001. These values show a
strong positive relationship between Q8 and Q27.
While the correlation of the responses Q8 (Too much
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on personal life) showed the lowest numerical value of any
of the correlations (Kendall's Tau B = .33 and Pearson's
r = .41), these values still indicated a fairly strong posi-
tive relationship between Q8 and Q30.
The results of the items intercorrelation study supports
the hypothesis of this investigator. Possible significance
of these results for Navy management are discussed in the
final chapter of this thesis. For the benefit of the reader,
a reproduction of the printout from the correlation analysis
is given in Appendix C.
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Utilizing the results described in Chapter III of this
thesis, of the analyses upon data obtained from officer
Separation Questionnaires NAVPERS 19 20/3 Rev. 1-73 and NAVPERS
1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3), a
determination of the reasons given for resigning from the
Naval service by 0-2 through 0-4 Surface Warfare officers
was made. This determination of reasons satisfied the first
research objective described in Chapter II of this thesis.
Another objective of this thesis was to take those reasons
and develop recommendations that might enable Navy manage-
ment to develop action plans aimed at having a positive
effect upon Surface Warfare officer retention. The remainder
of this chapter summarizes the research findings and pro-




The importance of the increasing trend (as described in
Chapter I) of Surface Warfare officers to resign from Naval
service cannot be overemphasized. The possible negative
impact on fleet readiness and the associated impact upon
national security caused by the failure of the Surface War-
fare community to meet needed retention goals (40% to 45%)




TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS-342)
RANK NAME (Last, First, Middle) SSN/FILE NO. /DESIGNATOR
YOUR REASONS FOR LEAVING THE NAVY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY (USE REVERSE SIDE IF
NECESSARY)
.
HERE THERE ANY ACTIONS WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD
HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO MAKE THE NAVY YOUR CAREER?
D YES (Please specify).
D NO
COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT MEASURES COULD
HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INFLUENCE OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.
Signature
Figure 4.1. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 19 20/3 Rev. 1-7 3 (in use from
January 1973 until April 1979)
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PRIVACY A<T STATEMENT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:
Under Hie authority of 5 USC 301 regulations.
Inforut loii la solicited from all separating
officers. Information furnished will not be
used r>r any adttlnlatrat 1 ve action concerning
you specifically and will not be made a part
of your permanent record.
The questionnaire Is required from all officers
separating from the Navy and solicits their
views on Navy life. The data obtained froa
this fora and others serves as a basis froa
which management Initiatives are derived. Your
candid comments are appreciated. Additional
coaaents are requested on the back of this fora
INSTRUCTIONS
Please use soft lead pencil to darken
responses (one response per Item).
QUESTION
If you are voluntarily separating, how Important
has eich of tiie following been In your decision
Co separate? If you are Involuntarily
separating, how lmportanc has each of the

















































































4. Of some Importance
3. Hot true or not lapottaot
1. Better civilian employment
opportunities
.
2. Dislike of military life-
style, rules and regulation*.
3. Poor promotion opportunities
snd policies.
4. Possible erosion of benefits.
5. Insufficient technical know-
ledge of superiors.
6. Lack of a career for given
spec laity/ designs tor.
7. Long hours and work pressure.
8. Too much family separation.
9. Lack of sufficient fringe
benefits.





12. Poor quality of living
quarters/BAQ Inequities.
13. Insufficient pay.
14. Not selected/not given oppor-
tunity to attend PC school
13. Type of education or training
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Long or extended deploy—
aents
.




Too such crisis management.
26. Lack of recognition for
accoapllshaencs/self respect
27. Geographic Instability/
transient nature of Navy.
28. Unable to sufficiently
plan and control career.
29. Unsstlsfactory officer
evaluation system.
30. Demands of Navy Imping-
ing on personal life.
£7 £7 £7O £7







£7 £7 £7 £7 £7
£7 £7 rr rr rr
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Figure 4.2. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Front) (in use




RANK NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE) DESIC
PLEASE EXPAND AS DESIRED ON YOUR INDICATED RESPONSES FOR LEAVINC THE NAVY:
PLE4SE INDICATE ANY ACTION WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY UAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO
REMAIN IN THE NAVY:
COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASON'S AND OPINION OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO INFLUENCE THIS OFFICER
TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY:
Figure 4.3. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Back) (in use
from April 1979 until October 1980)
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to do this might result in a future crisis in Surface
officer manning levels.
The review of the literature showed that retention of
Naval officers in all warfare designators has been viewed
by some as a problem since the late 1950 's [Fitzgerald,
1964]. Many studies have been conducted upon various (e.g.,
Sub-surface, Surface, Aviation) warfare specialities, and
many different facets of the retention problem have been
addressed. A few of these facets are: Commission source
and first/second duty assignments [Weitzman, et al., 1979],
the relationship between career values and retention [Neumann,
et al., 1972], marriage/ family issues and wife styles [Derr,
1979], job proficiency and organizational climate [Lassiter,
et al., 1976]. In spite of all these studies, retention of
Naval officers remains a problem.
The conclusions and recommendations which follow apply
specifically to Surface Warfare officer retention, but in
many respects may also apply to all other warfare designa-
tors. This researcher hopes that these conclusions and
recommendations will be useful in resolving the Naval offi-
cer retention problem.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions reached in this section are the results
of analysis of 281 officer Separation Questionnaires. The
sample was composed of responses to 133 NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev.
4-79 (shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3) and responses to 148
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NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (shown in Figure 4.1). These ques-
tionnaires were completed by 0-2 to 0-4 Surface Warfare
officers who had resigned from Naval service during the
period, late 1978 to 1 November 1980. Responses to Likert
scaled items along with written comments provided the data
upon which this investigator did the research. On the basis
of the results of the research, five basic conclusions were
reached. They were as follows:
Conclusion 1 : In terms of importance for resigning,
Surface Warfare officers reported too much family
separation as their number one reason.
Conclusion 2 : There exists a strong inter-relationship
between responses "too much family separation" and the
responses to; "long or extended deployments," "Navy
impinging on personal life", and "geographic instability/
transient nature of the Navy."
Conclusion 3 : The second most important stated reason
for resigning was insufficient pay.
Conclusion 4 : The major reasons given by the officers
in the OPNAV and thesis data base were similar: differ-
ent warfare designators responded similarly to the items
on the questionnaire. The major difference among reasons
given for resigning was in the degree of importance
placed on those reasons by individuals in the different
warfare designator groups.
Conclusion 5 : Major studies done on Naval officer
retention since 1964 (Secretary of the Navy's Task Force
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on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention) have outlined
the basic reasons for Naval officer resignations, but
a Naval officer retention problem still exists.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are based upon responses
drawn from the "top ten" list of most important reasons given
by Surface Warfare officers for resigning. In addition, one
recommendation is based upon written responses found on
Officer Separation Questionnaires NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73
(Figure 4.1) and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (shown in Figures
4.2 and 4.3). Another recommendation comes from the result
of the item intercorrelation study described in the results
section of Chapter III. This researcher developed four basic
recommendations . Two of those recommendations each contain
two parts. Those recommendations are:
• Establish Family Support Centers specifically designed
to meet the needs of a family with a deployed member.
• Continue effort on the part of top level Navy manage-
ment to achieve equitable compensation for sea-going
officers
.
• Establish an Officer Retention Ombudsman program.
. Conduct study to ascertain the underlying factors
(if any) causing the relationships among too much
family separation (Q8) and: long or extended deploy-
ments (Q22) , demands of Navy impining on personal life





Each of the specific recommendations will now be dis-
cussed. These discussions are for the purpose of providing
the reader with the reasoning used by this investigator
to arrive at those specific recommendations
.
Recommendation; Establish Family Support Centers .
The most important reason given by Surface Warfare offi-
cers for resigning from the Navy was too much family separa-
tion. Taken on its face value, this reason is a contradic-
tion of logic. When an officer elects to become a Surface
Warfare officer, that officer presumably knows that he or
she will have to go to sea to become a Surface Warfare
specialist. Why should a person select such a designator,
if too much family separation was going to bother them?
This investigator believed that too much family separation
was not precisely descriptive of the real reason for resign-
ing, just the closest reason available on the survey. The
following comments were taken from an 1110 Lieutenant's
Separation Questionnaire. These comments seemed to give
some of the underlying reasons behind the selection of "too
much family separation" as the most important reason for
leaving the Naval service. "I cannot best serve my Navy if
I am not sure my family is living well and is properly cared
for. I could cope with long separations if the Navy would
provide better family services." The commanding officer's
comments about the above officer were in part, "an excellent




Based upon the above comments, and others of a similar
nature, found throughout the comment section of the survey
questionnaires, this investigator interviewed sixty students
in attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
Ca. The interviews were conducted during October 19 80. All
of these students were 0-3 to 0-4 Surface Warfare officers
with families. They were all asked if too much family
separation was a problem for them. If they answered "yes",
they were then asked to describe what factor of family separa-
tion was their major concern. All of those interviewed answered
that family separations were a problem for them. The major
concern expressed was worry about the quality of services
being provided to their families by the Navy. These ser-
vices included dependent medical care, legal assistance,
counseling, etc.
Thesis research conducted by LCDR Bonnie Scott, USN (a
student at the Naval Postgraduate School) uncovered a problem
area in services being provided to Navy families. LCDR
Scott found that most Navy child care centers are not meeting
the childcare needs of Navy parents
.
The establishment of Family Support Centers specializing
in the needs felt by families with deployed members might do
much to ease the concern about family treatment felt by
deployed officers.
An additional recommendation dealing with too much family
separation is now discussed. In order to provide a basis for
70

this recommendation, the following assumptions are made
by this researcher. These assumptions are based on an unpub-
lished study done by Dr. Donald Perry (Director of Social
Services, S.B. Hayes Hospital, Ft. Ord, Ca.) during a three
year time span from 1975 until 1978.
1. Separation of family members due to deployments and
extended unaccompanied tours is stressful to those
-family members.
2. Individual family members are subjected to differ-
ent worries, fears and anxieties before, during and
after these separations
.
3. The family roles played by wives with children are
subjected to somewhat similar stresses during those
separations (and when the officers return home)
.
Given the above assumptions, the officer and his family
need to be aware of the problems likely to arise as a result
of a separation and to prepare for those problems.
LCDR Don Curran (USN, (a student at the Naval Postgradu-
ate School) developed a Family Separation workshop to attempt
to fulfill those family needs. The goals of LCDR Curran '
s
workshop were to make the officer and his family aware of
the problems which are likely to be encountered by all con-
cerned and to help prepare the officer and his family to deal
with those problems, thereby improving that families ability
to cope with the problems and stresses of separation.
Several Fleet units already employ such a workshop for
the entire crew. This workshop is usually given prior to
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a deployment. However, Family Separation workshops are not
given Navy wide. Within the Navy system, the Human Resource
Centers and Detachments have the resources and trained
facilitators available to design and administer a Navy wide,
standardized, and high quality workshop dealing with family
separation. The recommendation of this investigator is that
the Navy Human Resource System design and implement such a
workshop. This would benefit not only the officers and their
families, but the enlisted crew members and their families
as well. The effectiveness of such pre-deployment activities
has not been tested.
Recommendation: Increased Compensation for sea-going officers
While this thesis research was underway (November 1979 to
1 November 1980) , several increases to military compensation
were enacted. These pay increases (effective 1 October 19 80)
include an 11.7% across the board pay increase, the raising
of travel allowance to 18. 5 C per mile, and the establishment
of VHA (Variable Housing Allowance) for high cost living areas.
Top level Navy management should monitor officer compensation
and continue to press for future pay increases when they are
needed.
An additional recommendation in the compensation area
is made for Surface Warfare officers. This researcher feels
that sea pay for sea-going officers would have a positive
effect upon retention. Presently the Surface Warfare community
is the only warfare community that does not have some type
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of special pay associated with its warfare specialty. The
aviators receive flight pay and the submariners receive sub
pay. The payment of sea pay to Surface Warfare officers
would not only be a recognition of the hardships of sea-
duty but would also assist sea-going officers in the defray-
ment of unusual expenses incurred because of that sea-duty
(e.g., car storage, repairs around home that could have been
done if at houme, added childcare cost, etc.).
Recommendation; Establish an Officer Ombudsmen
Retention Program
Comments extracted from the written response sections
(Figures 4.1 and 4.3) of the Officer Separation Questionnaires
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79, indi-
cated a perceived lack of interest on the part of the Navy in
regards to the resignation of its Surface Warfare officers.
While only about 10% (=30) of the questionnaires analyzed
specifically mentioned this perceived lack of interest,
many more questionnaires alluded to this feeling. A few
of those comments are provided as illustrations of this
perception. The following comments are prefaced by the
designator and rank of the officer making that particular
comment
.
1110 LT I was surprised that absolutely no effort
was made by any Surface Warfare officer
to "ship me over".




1110 LT When I submitted my resignation, if the
Navy would have shown even a remote inter-
est in why I was leaving, I was prepared
to reconsider. The Navy just did not
care that I was leaving.
1160 LT Senior officers never counseled or even
asked about my Naval career plans. No
one asked me to stay in the Navy.
1160 LT No one asked me to stay in the Navy.
1110 LTJG The expression "The Navy takes care of
its own" is a lie. I honestly feel that
no one cares. This (questionnaire) is
the closest anyone has come to asking my
my opinion of Navy life in four years.
If someone had shown more interest in
me, I would have stayed in.
The above comments, and similar other ones made by re-
signing officers, led this investigator to the belief that
had the "Navy system" responded to the individuals making
those types of comments , many of those same officers could
have been retained. This investigator acknowledges the reality
of the Navy trying to retain only those officers who are
good performers. It is simply not in the best interest of
the Navy to try to retain all resigning officers. It is,
however, in the best interest of the Navy to properly manage
its scarce human resources. To aid in this management, an
officer retention ombudsman program should be established.
The mainstay of this program would be 0-5' s from each warfare
specialty. Each of these warfare specialty representatives
would have a strong working knowledge of the Navy personnel
"system" (e.g., detailing process, assignment desk process,
etc.) . Their function would be to screen the records of the
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officers who have submitted letters of resignation. If the
screening determined that it would be in the Navy's best
interest to retain that individual, the Ombudsman would then
contact the individual submitting a resignation. This con-
tact would be to provide counseling and possible assistance
in "ironing out" problems causing the resignation. The
Ombudsman program would give disgruntled officers a point of
contact within the Navy bureaucracy. This program would, at
a minimum, indicate that someone within the Navy bureaucracy
cares. These ombudsmen would, of course, need to have the
authority to cut across different areas of responsibility
within the Navy personnel management system.
Recommendation: Conduct a Study to Determine Possible
Underlying Causative Factors Leading
Officers to Leave the Navy .
The category "Too much family separation" is much too
encompassing to have much real meaning. This is also true
of "Long or extended deployments", "Geographic instability/
transient nature of the Navy", and "Demands of Navy impinging
on personal life. " Further studies should be done to pin
down the reasons why these responses were selected by re-
signing officers.
An interim report produced at the Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California [Derr, 1977] suggests research instru-
ments that would be useful in accomplishing the task of
ascertaining the real "whys" of selecting particular responses.
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Once the underlying causative factors were identified, Navy
management could develop action plans to solve or alleviate
those factors, thereby increasing officer retention.
The recommendations presented in this thesis were not
meant to be exhaustive. Instead, they were meant to be a
starting point for Navy management in the development of
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